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Normativity and the Will to Power:  




In this paper, I critically consider the Nietzschean version of constitutitivism that Paul 
Katsafanas has recently developed. My focus, following Katsafanas’s, is not on the exegetical 
issue of whether this constitutivism was indeed Nietzsche’s own view. It is rather on the 
philosophical question of whether the view itself is tenable. Do actions have a constitutive 
aim, in the way that Katsafanas supposes? If so, what is that aim? From the putative fact that 
actions have a constitutive aim, what would follow about the grounding of normativity in 
general? Will this approach yield up a tenable meta-ethical theory? While Nietzschean 
constitutivism is an ingenious and original position, it faces some serious challenges that it 
will have difficulty answering in a satisfactory way.  
 
Introduction 
 The past decade and a half has seen a considerable flowering of interest in 
Nietzsche’s meta-ethics. In this time, Nietzsche has been presented with nearly as wide a 
range of views in meta-ethics as there are exegetical options on the table—views ranging 
from nihilism to subjective realism to expressivism to fictionalism to objective realism to, 
most recently, constructivism and constitutivism. Interpreters must square Nietzsche’s 
apparently skeptical remarks about the objectivity of value with his seeming commitment to a 
certain privileged set of values, in light of which he purports to “revalue” the values of the 
moral tradition. Is this apparent commitment nothing more than rhetorical bluster? Or does he 
think that some values really have a privileged status? And if so, in virtue of what? This 
puzzle has elicited a number of elegant solutions and ingenious potential interpretations.  
  
 In his recent book, Paul Katsafanas adds one of—if not the—most philosophically-
sophisticated options to the mix by developing a Nietzschean form of constitutivism, a view 
more often associated with Kant, but in its broad outlines, amenable to a Nietzschean version 
as well.
i
 The aim of Katsafanas’s book is to do more than simply resolve an exegetical puzzle 
in Nietzsche scholarship. He wants develop a distinctive meta-ethical theory rooted in 
Nietzsche’s work. What he arrives at is a view of considerable ambition and interest that 
offers to be a way not just of making sense of Nietzsche’s work, but of how we are to 
understand the grounding of normativity. As he notes in various places in his book, he is 
more concerned to establish the theory’s philosophical credentials than to argue that it was 
indeed Nietzsche’s own view. So in what follows, I’ll be concerned exclusively with the 
philosophical, as opposed to exegetical, questions that arise with this Nietzschean view and 
with the constitutivist strategy that Katsafanas has taken up.  
 In the philosophical literature thus far, constitutivism has mainly been associated with 
the work of David Velleman and especially that of Christine Korsgaard.
ii
 Katsafanas takes his 
inspiration from these views, but wants to put forward an account that improves on their 
weaknesses—and that promises advantages over rival non-constitutivist meta-ethical views, 
including Humeanism and non-reductive realism. Although I think there are good potential 
replies to the difficulties that Katsafanas has raised for several of these views, those matters 
will not be my focus of attention here. The guiding questions of my paper will be internal 
ones that arise for his form of constitutivism itself: Do actions have a constitutive aim, in the 
way that Katsafanas supposes? If so, what is that aim? From the putative fact that actions 
have a constitutive aim, what would follow about the grounding of normativity in general? 
Will this approach yield up a tenable meta-ethical theory? While I have great admiration for 
the ingenuity and originality of the view Katsafanas has put forward, ultimately I think it 
faces some serious challenges that it will have difficulty answering in a satisfactory way.  
  
 
Constitutive Aims and the Generation of Normativity 
 I would like to begin by exploring a foundational idea for the constitutivist project— 
the notion of a constitutive aim.
iii
 Games are natural way of introducing this idea. Games 
ordinarily have a clear goal, such as, in chess, check-mating one’s opponent. In order to count 
as playing the game, one supposedly needs to take that goal as one’s aim. This goal in turn 
gives rise to the standards of success, whereby one judges the moves in the game as good 
chess moves. Normativity in successful chess-playing thus is thought to arise out of the aims 
one necessarily needs to have in order to count as playing chess.
iv
 The constitutivist wants to 
extend this lesson and make the case that not only do games involve constitutive aims, but so 
too do beliefs and actions in general. Their constitutive aims are thought to generate 
analogous standards of success, and thereby, to provide a grounding for epistemic and 
practical normativity in general.
v
  
 Defining a constitutive aim, Katsafanas writes:  
[Constitutive Aims:] 
Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. A constitutively aims at G iff: 
(i) each token of A aims at G, and 
 (ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A.
vi
 
Katsafanas follows this with what he describes as a “relatively uncontroversial” claim about 
how aims relate to standards of success:  
Success: If A aims at G, then G is a standard of success for A.
vii
 
So if playing chess aims at check-mate, then check-mate is a standard of success for playing 
chess.  Katsafanas goes on to gloss this Success claim as meaning “that aims generate 
standards of success” (emphasis mine).viii  
  
 Now for the first point I would like to discuss. It seems to me that Katsafanas has 
moved from what is indeed a relatively uncontroversial claim, Success, to one that is 
considerably more controversial. Does it follow from Success that aims generate standards of 
success in a given activity or practice? Much depends on what is meant by “generate.” For 
constitutivism to get going as a distinctive meta-ethical theory, this idea of generation would 
need to be doing ambitious work in explaining the grounding for normativity. Standards of 
success would need to be grounded in aims. A natural way of capturing this idea is the 
following: 
Generation: A’s constitutively aiming at G grounds the fact that the standards of 
success for A-ing are given by G and grounds the fact that G has the reason-giving 
character that it does.  
Could this be what the Nietzschean constitutivist wants? Possibly. Notice, however, that 
Success does not imply Generation. After all, the conditional in Success could be true, even if 
that grounding claim in Generation were false. It may be G’s being a standard of success for 
A is an independent fact, not a function of A’s inescapably aiming at G. Consider an 
alternative claim also compatible with Success—call it Generation*.  
Generation*: The fact of G’s being a standard of success for A-ing grounds the fact 
that A must constitutively aim at G.  
According to Generation*, the fact that there is a goal serving as a standard of success in a 
given activity explains why those who are engaging in the activity must take that aim as 
action-guiding and reason-giving insofar as they are to be engaged in that activity. Consider 
the standard example of chess again. The game of chess is governed by a series of 
conventional rules, which specify, among other things, the conditions under which one wins, 
namely by check-mating one’s opponent. Thereby, it provides players with a goal at which to 
aim. People come to be playing chess, and not playing another game, or indeed playing no 
  
game at all, when they guide their actions by the goal of trying to achieve check-mate (and 
also, of course, by hewing to certain rules in doing so). The standard of success thereby 
generates the aim constitutive of chess playing, not the reverse. Indeed, the reverse is difficult 
even to fathom. What would it even take for Generation to be true in the case of chess? It is 
not as if people were just antecedently aiming at taking the opponent’s king and this aiming 
grounds why the standard of success is as it is. Without recourse to a conventionally-
acknowledged standard of success, participants in the game could not conceptualize their 
activity as one of aiming in the sense necessary. In fact, I can’t see how they could even think 
of themselves as playing the game at all. So even in the supposedly paradigm case of 
constitutive aims, Generation is questionable. It seems to have gotten things backwards. 
Standards of success are more fundamental than constitutive aims. At the very least, if 
Success is true, Generation* is a good possibility for explaining the relation that obtains 
between aims, goals, and standards of success, as specified in Success.  
 Yet the constitutivist’s ambition, remember, is meta-normative: to explain the 
grounding for normativity through appeal to the constitutive aim of belief and action. 
Generation had ambitions of carrying this off by saying how aims themselves “generate” 
standards of success, with those standards of success being the rabbit pulled out of the hat 
that is the aim.  Generation* would no longer be doing that. Normativity would have its 
grounding independently of our aims, and it would explain what those aims need to be, if we 
are to be engaged in a given activity. Generation* would thus allow that certain normative 
standards are basic and have their reason-giving character independently of our aims. This 
issue is particularly important where, unlike in chess, the standards of success seem to be a 
matter of more than mere convention. Presumably it was the Nietzschean constitutivist’s 
skepticism about the realist leanings of this ‘standards-first’ conception of normativity in 
such fields that drove him to try to anchor normativity for beliefs and actions in something 
  
seemingly more naturalistically-respectable: our inescapable aims as human agents. If 
Generation* is all Nietzschean constitutivism is committed to, though, it is puzzling how it 
would be an alternative to realism, as it presents itself to be. The more distinctive, ambitious, 
and interesting thesis is one about the grounding (or, to use Korsgaard’s word, the “source”ix) 
of normativity in the aims constitutive of action or belief. I think this is what the Nietzschean 
constitutivist is really after.
x
 To get this, though, one must endorse Generation, or some 
similarly ambitious thesis in the vicinity. Yet however plausible Generation* and Success 
may be, they do not entail Generation. The move from the fact that in believing and acting, 
we aim at certain goals and are thereby subject to certain standards of success, to the claim 
that those standards themselves are grounded in our so aiming, is, so far as I can tell, simply a 
non sequitur. One challenge for Nietzschean constitutivism is thus to render Generation (or 
some similarly ambitious thesis) plausible, without simply trading on the plausibility of other, 
more modest theses.  
 
Aims, Normativity, and Deriving an “Ought” from an “Is” 
 Central to the Nietzschean constitutivist’s position is the idea that certain kinds of 
states have “inescapable” aims.xi  This idea of inescapable aims is not simply a generic 
descriptive claim. Nor, as I understand it, is it simply a normative claim about what the aim 
of actions or beliefs should be. It is, first and foremost, a universally-quantified descriptive 
claim about what their aim is. These inescapable aims, the constitutivist will then seek to 
claim, ground reasons about what we should do and thus provide a foundation for 
normativity. One major challenge, raised already by David Enoch, is how we move from this 
fact about aims to anything with serious normative implications.
xii
 Enoch writes: “The move 
from ‘You inescapably Φ’ to ‘You should Φ’ is no better—not even the tiniest little bit 
better—than the move from ‘You actually Φ’ to ‘You should Φ’.”xiii 
  
 Although Katsafanas seeks to forestall this objection, he does not do so successfully. 
His response is to claim that Enoch has misstated the constitutivist strategy. The 
constitutivist, according to Katsafanas, is not moving from ‘You inescapably Φ’ to ‘You 
should Φ’. Rather, he is moving from ‘You inescapably aim at Φ-ing’ to ‘You should Φ.’ 
According to Katsafanas, the aim itself is reason-providing, not the inescapability of the 
action in accordance with the aim.
xiv
  
 I see two main problems with this reply. First, although Katsafanas’s clarification is 
helpful, the basic worry still remains. The shift to talk of “aims” doesn’t defuse the 
fundamental problem that Enoch has raised. We are still moving from a certain descriptive 
fact—the fact of having certain aims—to a certain normative fact—the existence of non-
instrumental, categorical reasons that are supposed to be grounded in the having of those 
aims. We continue, so far as I can tell, to move from an “is” to an “ought.”  Nietzschean 
constitutivism’s promise is that we can get categorical, non-instrumental normativity from 
the austere structure of agency. But that ambitious strategy can’t, I fear, be pulled off without 
deriving an “ought” from an “is.” A challenge for constitutivism is to establish either that it is 
not moving from an “is” to an “ought,” or that doing so is not the serious problem that it is 
often thought to be—all the while bearing in mind that the “ought” we end up with must be 
something more than just that of instrumental rationality.  
 That brings me to my second point. Even if the aim we happen to have is reason-
providing in some sense, this need be of little deep normative significance, beyond simply 
providing us with easily-defeatable reasons. Consider what I shall call the Argument from 
Aims Perversion.  
Aims-Perversion: Some misguided and extremely powerful economists, convinced that 
they understand the human good, spray a certain powerful brain-altering potion into the 
atmosphere that makes us strive after maximizing utility (understood as personal 
  
preference satisfaction) in everything we do, at the expense (say) of striving for power. 
Utility-maximization is now, thanks to this potion, what we are all striving for in all our 
actions.
xv
 We no longer attempt anything unless it is, among the choices available to us, 
utility-maximal in this regard.  
Thanks to this intervention, utility-maximization would now, I take it, be our “inescapable” 
aim.
xvi
 Our psychology would be altered, such that we can’t strive for anything else. But 
would this drastic alteration in aims generate different standards of success for actions? In 
some thin sense, yes. Given that our aims are altered, the standards of success relative to 
those aims are thereby altered too. But does the constitutivist want to claim that our 
overriding reasons for action now stem from these altered aims? If so, constitutivism is little 
better than a crude form of Humeanism, over which it touts itself as an improvement. The 
aims that we simply find ourselves with, taken as they are, do not generate normatively-
significant standards of success for action.  
 Now, if the constitutivist then goes on to insist that this utility-maximization is not 
really the aim of action, then we may begin to suspect that this notion of the aim of action 
was already normatively-laden all along—a function not simply of what actions do in fact 
aim at, but of some implicit idea of what they should aim at, particularly where the two come 
apart. But then, if that is so, normativity is not really coming from the aims themselves after 
all, when this was just what Nietzschean constitutivism was promising. The Argument from 
Aims Perversion is basically a retooled version of Enoch’s basic challenge: Just because 
actions all aim at something, it doesn’t follow that there should be any serious normative 
significance in their so aiming. 
 
Constitutive Aims and Action  
  
 Now let us turn to discuss the heart of the constitutivist’s case: the close connection 
between aims and action that is thought to generate the normative standards for assessing 
those actions. The constitutivist’s idea here would be that actions all aim at something. Of 
course, actions have all kinds of different, more particular aims. So what the constitutivist 
will need to claim is, first, that there is nonetheless a common aim that they are all share and, 
second, that it is in virtue of this common aim that they are constituted as actions.
xvii
  
 Let us recall Katsafanas’s claim that I earlier labeled Constitutive Aims: 
Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. A constitutively aims at G iff: 
(i) each token of A aims at G, and 
 (ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A.
xviii
  
It would seem that two commitments of the constitutivist therefore need to be: 
Commonality: All actions have at least one common aim (by i).  
Constitution: It is partly in virtue of this common aim that something is an action (by 
ii).  
I will discuss Commonality at greater length in the section to follow, when I discuss whether 
a Nietzschean theory of the aim of action (particularly the dimension focusing on power) is 
likely to be right. The best way to test the merits of these claims is to consider a particular 
Nietzschean constitutivist story about what the aim of action is. But let us put that aside for 
the time being and consider Commonality and Constitution at a more general level first. I 
shall state my main concern outright, and then frame the challenge in terms of that concern. 
Actions certainly have aims. The question is whether they have an aim. Likewise, the having 
of aims are part of what makes something be an action. The question is whether the having of 
some particular aim is what makes something be an action. As I see it, a major challenge for 
the constitutivist is to explain why Commonality and Constitution are more likely to be 
correct than a less loaded theory about what constitutes actions as such.  
  
 To that end, let me sketch a simple alternative theory. I don’t have ambitions of 
giving a full-blown account of what separates actions from non-actions here, and there are 
certainly borderline cases (e.g., what to say about absentmindedly twirling a pencil, what to 
say about corporate agents, complex computers and so on). Let’s begin with several truisms 
about what I take to be the key concept of action at issue: Chairs don’t perform actions, even 
when they have a massage function. Clouds don’t perform actions, even when they pour 
down rain. An agent who accidentally falls, or is pushed down the steps is not performing an 
action. Cats and dogs can perform actions, yet plants don’t, even when they are drawn toward 
the sun. Nor, in the relevant sense of “action,” do humans perform an action, when their 
intestines digest their lunch.  
 As a first stab at what makes something an action:  
Action-Minimalism: Actions are purposive behaviors that aim at the achievement of 
some goal or other that the entity performing the action is guided by and on some 
level represents to itself.   
This would seem to be a pretty decent account of what makes something an action (as 
opposed to some other type of event). The Nietzschean constitutivist will, however, need to 
say that this is not sufficient. More is needed to make it an action. There is a debate amongst 
them about what that is, but they are agreed that something more is needed (this will then 
underpin Constitution). The Nietzschean constitutivist begins by claiming there is some 
additional feature all actions have (Commonality). He then seems to be reasoning in the 
following fashion: 
1. There is some element x (viz., a particular kind of aim) over and above what it is 
specified in Action-Minimalism that is an “inescapable” characteristic of all 
actions.  
  
2. (Hidden Premise) If x is an “inescapable” characteristic of action, it is a 
constitutive feature of action.  
3. Therefore, x is a constitutive feature of action.  
I think this Hidden Premise, and thus the soundness of this form of argument, is more 
questionable than the constitutivist realizes. Now, much hangs on how exactly this rather 
wooly word “inescapable” is to be understood. What is its modal profile? In just what sense 
is the proffered aim “inescapable”? Is the claim of inescapability anchored in an empirical 
psychological hypothesis about how all humans (and other sophisticated animals maybe) are 
constituted, such that whenever they act, they, given their constitution, strive for a certain 
goal? Or is it anchored in a conceptual claim about the very nature of action—that it is 
impossible for there to be something that counts as an action that does not aim at the 
constitutivist’s favored goal? Or something else still? I’m not sure there is a clear answer 
here, nor is there likely to be agreement among various constitutivists, but this is an issue that 
is worth flagging for further consideration.  
 But this issue aside, even if all actions involve self-constitution, or self-understanding, 
or agential activity, or power—the constitutivist’s favorite candidates for inescapable aims—
this needn’t be what makes them actions. It may be that, on some level, every action, 
however small, helps constitute us as agents. It may be that, on some level, every action, 
however small, yields its agent self-understanding. It may be that, on some level, every 
action, however small, involves overcoming obstacles and resistances (this is Katsafanas’s 
preferred understanding of power, a supposed aim of all action).  But we should ask: even if 
this is true, are the actions aiming at these things? Might these things instead be inescapable 
preconditions, bi-products, or concomitants of actions, instead of what the action is aiming at 
and the aiming at which makes it be an action?   
  
 Compare this: It is plausible that either as the result, or the precondition, of every 
action, that some degree of energy is expended. I suspect there is no action (in the actual 
world, anyway) on the part of an agent without some energy being expended. Of course, 
some actions, such as eating most foods, may increase net energy, but there will be an 
expenditure in order to get that net increase. And even on the assumption that there are purely 
mental actions, some small expenditure of energy presumably is required. But is expending 
energy, even if it “inescapably” happens with all actions, what makes an action be an action? 
The Nietzschean constitutivist, remember, appears to be reasoning in the following way: If 
something is an “inescapable” feature of x, then it is constitutive feature of x. But does that 
follow? Can there be “inescapable” features of something that are not constitutive features of 
it—on one gloss of the word “inescapable”: features present, and perhaps not just 
coincidentally, in every actual instance of it, but not responsible for making it the thing that it 
is?  
 Consider the properties of being a renate and being a cordate.  At the level of species 
characteristics anyway, all renates are cordates. But what makes something be a renate is 
having kidneys—even if all renates also have hearts, and even if there is an important 
biological story to be told about why those two properties move in tandem. Now, 
constitutivists may stress that whereas this point just made, or the point about energy, is an 
empirical claim, he or she is making a conceptual claim. While this move to a purely 
conceptual claim may come more naturally to Velleman or Korsgaard, Katsafanas will have 
trouble making this move. He wants his theory about the inescapable aim of action to be 
grounded better in the empirical facts of actual human psychology. So I suspect it is not a 
purely conceptual point he is making, but rather a claim about the aim of actions, as revealed 




 Yet suppose it is not meant as an a posteriori claim of this form, but instead as a 
purely conceptual one: All actions, insofar as they are actions, must by their nature aim at the 
thing specified (whether self-understanding, self-constitution, power, etc). Even when it 
comes to purely conceptual claims, I’m not sure it is right, in general, that all necessary 
features (and that is probably modally stronger than “inescapable” features) of something are 
constitutive features. A case could be made that the two can come apart. It is a necessary 
(thus “inescapable”) property of any object that it is self-identical; but it is presumably not a 
constitutive property.
xx
Consider, by contrast, a paradigmatic constitutive property of a 
triangle: Being a closed, three-sided figure. It follows from this necessarily (thus also 
“inescapably”) that it will have three, four, or five sides. But this disjunctive fact is not what 
makes it be a triangle, but simply something that follows necessarily (or “inescapably”) from 
what does: the fact of being a closed figure with three sides.
xxi
 Now one might here make the 
rejoinder that the relevant inescapable properties should be those had by all and only the 
triangles, whereas this disjunctive property is had by rectangles and pentagons too.
xxii
 I think 
this will still not be enough to salvage the constitutivist’s point. For consider the conjunctive 
property of being self-identical and a closed, three-sided figure. This is inescapably had by all 
and only the triangles. But it would not seem itself to be a constitutive feature, since the 
former conjunct does no constitutive work.  
 The general problem here is that the Nietzschean constitutivist would seem to be 
moving from the “inescapability” of some feature of action to that feature being constitutive 
of action. That move would seem to be unwarranted. If the constitutivist is not making this 
move, then it is difficult to see how y’s being an inescapable feature of x could have any 
decisive bearing on the constitution of  x.  
 To review the arc of this section thus far, I have granted for the sake of argument that 
certain features of action are “inescapable.” I have then argued that it doesn’t follow that they 
  
are constitutive in making the thing be an action. It is thus not obvious that Constitution 
follows from Commonality. This is not simply a bit of Scholastic caviling. My interest, in 
raising this point, is to press on why we should be tempted beyond a minimalist theory as the 
right account of Constitution. Doesn’t Action Minimalism give us enough for what makes 
something an action? A challenge for the constitutivist is to say why this flat-footed account 
of action is insufficient. 
 Now, let us grant the point that in the actual world we do, in all our actions, aim at 
(say) power. Does the Nietzschean constitutivist really want to claim that, in other possible 
worlds where, for various reasons, we aim, in our action-like behaviors, at things other than 
power, we aren’t truly acting? Or does he want to deny the very possibility of such a 
scenario? Both options seem very implausible. The account of action, if it is really a claim 
about what constitutes actions as actions, as it purports to be, should not just be 
psychologically apt in the actual world, but modally robust as a claim about action 
constitution across other possible worlds. It may be that, given the way we are 
psychologically disposed, we aim, as the Nietzschean constitutivist claims, at encountering 
and overcoming obstacles and resistances whenever we act. But that is not what it is to act, as 
can be seen simply from imagining scenarios where we engage in purposive behaviors that 
aim at the achievement of some goal or other that we are guided by and represent to 
ourselves, but where we do not aim at encountering or overcoming obstacles and resistances 
in doing so.  
 As a matter of fact, though, I don’t think the point, assumed for the sake of argument, 
about all actual actions having a certain inescapable aim is correct. In the case of all the aims 
constitutivists have specified, some token state can lack this aim and still be an action.
xxiii
 But 
we get into murky territory here, because it is difficult to see what makes it the case that an 
action is aiming at the thing specified as opposed to at something else or at nothing at all, in 
  
such a way that there might be fruitful debate over this question. How do we get an 
independent grip on what its aim is? It presumably is not an explicit, consciously occurrent 
aim of the acting agent, as is my aim of getting some milk at the grocery store when I go for 
that purpose. How then are we to adjudicate potential counterexamples?  
 One resultant strategy, in the face of this, is simply to treat action, as the constitutivist 
is using it, as a term of philosophical art and to grant the constitutive connection between 
actions and the favored goal that the constitutivist likes. This style of criticism has been very 
nicely developed by David Enoch.
xxiv
 The question then gets pushed back a level: Why 
should we care about acting as opposed to “schmacting” (where that is doing something very 
similar, but just not aiming at self-constitution, or power, or whatever.) I’m very sympathetic 
to this strategy of Enoch’s, and it is complementary to my own, but I think it is also worth 
considering, at the same time, whether the constitutivist has given an adequate 
characterization of the folk theoretic concept of action. Action-Minimalism may be all we 
need to understand what constitutes something as an action. A challenge for the Nietzschean 
constitutivist is to explain why we need more.  
 
The Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism 
 In the previous sections, I explored more general questions that arise for the 
constitutivist project—specifically, what it would be for belief and action to have a 
constitutive aim in the first place. In this section I would like to explore in more detail the 
Nietzschean conception of what the aims of action are. On Katsafanas’s account, there are 
two constitutive aims of action: agential activity and power. According to the first, actions 
aim for a certain equilibrium, whereby the agent A’s, approves of her A-ing, and further 
information would not undermine this approval. According to the second, actions aim at 
power, understood as encountering and overcoming obstacles and resistances.
xxv
 The second 
  
aim, according to Katsafanas, promises to generate more substantive normative content, so, 
for that reason, and for reasons of space, I shall focus on it.
xxvi
  
 There is some debate about what sort of will-to-power thesis Nietzsche endorses and 
its overall importance in his thought. That is an exegetical debate that I will not get into here. 
I tend to be unconvinced that Nietzsche—especially if we are cautious in our use of the 
Nachlaß—should be read as aiming at a totalizing psychological hypothesis about the aim of 
every action. I also tend to be unconvinced that it should be understood as the anchor of his 
revaluation of values. Power is simply one among several values, whose importance have 
hitherto been wrongly denigrated in the Judeo-Christian moral tradition. But to the extent that 
power is important for Nietzsche, there is a feature of the secondary literature that is worth 
pausing on for a moment, because the constitutivist project builds so much on it. It is now 
often pointed out that power for Nietzsche is not a matter simply of brute domination. The 
alternative that has been developed by Bernard Reginster emphasizes the encountering and 
overcoming of obstacles and resistances.
xxvii
 There are plausible intuitions in the background 
here. Real power seems to involve attaining something that is difficult to attain, thereby 
overcoming obstacles in the process. Let us call this conception Power-as-Overcoming. 
Power-as-Overcoming: Power amounts to encountering and overcoming obstacles 
and resistances.  
Though this is a very helpful corrective to the idea of power merely as brute domination, it 
seems to me that there is a danger of moving from what power often involves, or what 
valuable instances of it involve, to what power in general is.
xxviii
 I think if we focus on 
encountering and overcoming obstacles and resistances exclusively, we may obscure much of 
what Nietzsche is actually talking about in the places where he discusses the goal of power 
and our striving for it, and we may end up with a philosophically implausible account of 
power. Again, I’m not trying to make that full exegetical case here, but I would like to draw 
  
attention to two other aspects of power, or ways of thinking about it, that are important for 
the meta-ethical and action-theoretic issues at hand. Compare these two other dimensions of 
power: 
Power-as-Capacities: Power consists in those features that enable you to function 
well in bringing about goals you have (or goals that are worthwhile). In striving for 
power, we strive to develop and/or maintain such features of ourselves.   
Power-as-Dominance- Power consists in being (at least temporarily) in a position 
where you feel you have succeeded in bringing about goals you have (or goals that are 
worthwhile) and that feeling is veridical (i.e, it is not simply an illusion of success that 
underwrites your feeling). In striving for power, we strive for such a feeling. 
Both one’s capacities and one’s having achieved dominance are typically related to the 
obstacles and resistances that one actually has or can potentially overcome. So there is a close 
internal connection among Power-as Overcoming, Power-as-Capacities and Power-as-
Dominance. It may even be true (though it is more contentious than it is often made out to be) 
that willing Power-as-Dominance or Power-as-Capacities, one must thereby will obstacles 
and resistance too.  
 I suspect this connection actually relies on the rather strained Nietzschean thesis about 
the interconnectedness of everything—that if we want one thing, we should want everything, 
etc. Absent that, the plausibility of needing to will to encounter and overcome obstacles and 
resistances significantly diminishes. After all, why can I not care about, and will to have, 
Power-as-Capacities and Power-as-Dominance without caring about, or willing to have, 
Power-as-Overcoming, particularly in certain limited domains? I might view Power-as-
Overcoming, in many cases, as necessary (if indeed it is), but as something regrettable, on my 
way to achieving the other two sorts of power, and thus may not aim at it per se. The plane 
may have to go through the clouds to get from A to B, but that doesn’t mean its pilot is 
  
aiming at the clouds. Furthermore, even if it is true that we are always aiming at power, let 
alone maximal power, in every action, a stronger case needs to be made that we are, in every 
action, aiming at power in the sense of encountering and overcoming obstacles and 
resistances, and not instead aiming at power in one of the other two senses primarily. I 
suspect that in many spheres of human activity, we actually aim Power-as-Dominance, and 
are simply forced to put up with obstacles and resistances as an unavoidable way of getting 
there. In many other spheres, we care about Power-as-Capacities, but this is simply a concern 
for a dispositional feature of us that does not involve the need to encounter and overcome 
actual obstacles and resistances at all, merely to have the ability to do so, should the need 
arise.  
 The constitutivist seeks to soften somewhat his psychological claim about striving for 
power by noting that in many actions, we are not aiming at obstacles and resistances of any 
kind whatsoever, but only those specific to the activity. To this end, Katsafanas distinguishes 
two different claims:  
(A) Whenever we act, we aim to encounter and overcome resistance of any and all 
kinds.  
(B) Whenever we act, we aim to encounter and overcome resistances that are related 
to the activity we are performing.
xxix
  
It seems to me that (B) is certainly more plausible than (A). But I don’t think either is really 
psychologically apt. In many kinds of activities we perform, we do not aim at encountering 
and overcoming obstacles and resistances, even ones specific to those activities. Consider an 
ordinary day. Because I am extremely near-sighted, I must leave my glasses in the same place 
every night, or I will not be able to find them in the morning. When I first wake up, I want 
them near me. I do not aim to encounter and overcome resistances, as a child might in an 
easter egg hunt. Then I have coffee. I do not aim for resistance in this activity either. I don’t 
  
hope for the machine to be broken so I have challenge of fixing it, without the benefit of 
caffeine or my glasses. Then I read the newspaper. Compared with other things that I read, 
The Guardian is not particularly challenging. But still, there are far less taxing ways of 
getting the news. I think it would be a mistake, though, to characterize my aim in reading this 
paper as one of encountering and overcoming obstacles and resistances, even if that is 
something I must “inescapably” do in reading it. Rather, a better description is that I value 
the intelligent, sophisticated way the news is presented. Accordingly I will encounter 
relatively more obstacles and resistances in reading it as I would if I were having it read to 
me, or reading a tabloid paper with 4th grade prose, large, colorful pictures, and scant 
analysis. Perhaps after this, I will go the gym and use the rowing machine. Here I do want 
resistance. I turn a crank that, quite literally, sets “the resistance” higher. Or maybe I will 
play squash. In order for it to be a fun game, I don’t want to play against someone I can 
easily beat. I want to play with someone closer to my rather modest level or better. And later 
in the day, there will be various intellectual endeavors where I do value encountering and 
overcoming obstacles and resistances in working through interpretive puzzles or 
philosophical arguments.  
 I mention these various examples, because it is important to bear in mind the diversity 
of mundane human action. We should not generalize from the fact that in some activities, 
obstacles and resistances are part of what we value about the activity to this immensely 
totalizing conclusion. The constitutivist theory moves from the alleged fact that in order to 
act, we must encounter and overcome at least some minimal level of resistance to the 
implausible psychological inference that we are aiming at such resistances in all that we 
do.
xxx
 Insofar as I can get a grip on what it is for an action to be aiming at something, this 
doesn’t seem to me to be a very plausible general thesis. It is true of some actions, but not of 
others.  
  
 I myself prefer construing Nietzsche’s will to power psychology in a less totalizing 
way. This more modest Nietzschean account has a surprising and interesting conclusion when 
it comes to the posited motivational apparatus: In the case of some goals, we are willing not 
just the goal, but resistance to achieving that goal. That’s an important observation, and it is 
helpful for understanding certain kinds of actions. But the thesis becomes drastically less 
plausible when it is generalized to actions as such. This more modest Nietzschean account 
that I prefer has another surprising and interesting psychological thesis to offer: A desire for 
power motivates far more human actions than we have hitherto thought, even those that, 
superficially, don’t seem motivated by it. We can convincingly explain a range of puzzling 
and often perverse human phenomena in terms of this. But, I would say, we needn’t make 
this a totalizing, universal claim either. After all, what about simple actions that aim, 
apparently, at relaxation: Sitting on a porch and sipping iced tea and enjoying the spring 
sunshine. This is an action. But it is not plausibly aiming at power in any sense.
xxxi
 It may 
involve encountering and overcoming minimal obstacles and resistances (e.g., not dropping 
the glass, etc.). But first, it isn’t plausibly aiming at this, and second and more importantly, 
even if it were, doing so would not be what makes it be an action. The constitutivist would 
need both claims to be true, and yet both are very doubtful. 
 One defensive strategy on the part of the constitutivist is to say that even if some 
isolated action doesn’t aim at power, it is part of a larger action aiming at power.xxxii I need 
my glasses in order to see. I need coffee in order to function. I need relaxation on off days to 
be more powerful on other days. We might agree that these smaller-scale actions can be 
construed as part of larger actions that are directed toward power. But, first, are we aiming at 
Power-as-Overcoming primarily or exclusively, or are we aiming at power in one of the other 
senses I outlined, particularly Power-as-Capacities? And second, is it plausible that indirectly 
aiming at Power-as-Overcoming is what makes these smaller token actions be actions? That I 
  
really don’t see at all. The more attenuated the connection gets between the action and the 
allegedly constitutive goal, the less likely it is that aiming at the goal is what makes it be an 
action.
xxxiii
 Now, if we are inventive enough, and provide tortuous psychological 
redescriptions of every action, we can get something reminiscent of the sort of account that 
undergraduates concoct to vindicate dogmatically the idea that really we are motivated by 
egoistic considerations, or the desire for pleasure all the time. Yet human psychology is more 
varied, interesting and complex that this. Power is a central, and often neglected aspect of 
that psychology. Few were as astute about this as Nietzsche was. But this striving for power 
(and particularly the striving for maximal power) is unlikely to the universal motive in or 
feature of human action, and it is especially unlikely if power is construed as a matter of 
overcoming obstacles and resistances. A challenge for the constitutivist is not just to re-
describe creatively every potential counterexample using this posited motivation, but to 
explain why it is the most plausible and compelling way of making agents and actions 
intelligible across the board.  
 
The Full Extent and Overriding Character of Normativity 
 I have so far discussed the Nietzschean constitutivist’s contention that a constitutive 
aim of action is power, because this is the constitutive aim that has the potential to deliver the 
most substance in the normative and meta-normative account built up from it. I now would 
like to discuss the picture that it leaves us with. Katsafanas’s constitutivism frames itself as 
an alternative to rival meta-ethical theories, including Humeanism and non-naturalist 
objective realism. It seeks to overcome problems that those theories, and others, face.
xxxiv
  
 But I think it is worth asking to what extent it is a meta-normative theory that can 
even claim to be a rival at all, let alone a superior one. Simply from the supposed fact that we 
aim at power, and that the will to power can serve as a standard for assessing other values, it 
  
does not follow that the constitutivist is making a meta-ethical claim at all. In order to be 
such a theory, it would have to make general claims about the nature of normativity as such. 
It needs to have a view about what normativity is grounded in. Or, in the locution of reasons, 
it would have to explain what gives reasons their reason-giving character. At times, 
particularly when it frames itself as a rival to other major views, it seems to have that 
ambition. Recall, from earlier in the paper, the claim: 
Generation: A’s constitutively aiming at G grounds the fact that the standards of 
success for A-ing are given by G and grounds the fact that G has the reason-giving 
character that it does. 
Generation is a distinctive claim about what normativity is grounded in. But the idea that 
constitutivism is a rival to Humeanism or objective realism or even Kantian constitutivism is 
rather misleading, though. Those theories seek to offer accounts of what in general provides 
the grounding for what we have reason to do—in particular, for what we have most reason to 
do. Nietzschean constitutivism is not able to do this, nor does it, in the end, turn out to have 
ambitions of doing so. The constitutive aim of action, Katsafanas argues, simply provides pro 
tanto reasons, not overriding reasons.
xxxv
 But that is tantamount to saying that there are other, 
more important kinds of reasons. And the normative force of those (in many cases) 
overriding reasons is left wholly unexplained by the Nietzschean constitutivist’s story. What 
endows these other reasons with their normative force, one might well wonder? 
 This concern becomes particularly pronounced when the constitutivist seeks to 
explain why we do not have reasons simply to maximize power in every circumstance (or to 
do in the present only what will be conducive to maximal power in the long run.) Of various 
activities which would involve the overcoming of obstacles and resistances, why choose 
some over others? Why choose some paths of lesser power over paths of more power? The 
constitutivist wisely wants to say that we have other reasons that are stronger, and thus in 
  
many cases, decisive in swaying us from always maximizing power.
xxxvi
 For there are all 
kinds of activities that involve surmounting and overcoming great obstacles and resistances, 
but some of these are heinous, others vapid. I could carry out a series of carefully-plotted 
serial killings, seeking the challenge of resisting detection for as long as possible, 
surmounting the obstacle of having more bystanders nearby, more feisty victims, etc. But this 
doesn’t give me reason to do it. Or, in a different and less morally repellent vein, I could try 
to eat as many hot chicken wings as possible in a short amount of time. (Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, I could also devote that same time to doing a lower-resistance, but 
seemingly worthwhile activity: catching up over Skype with an old friend that I care very 
much about.) Presumably, the sensible constitutivist will want to say that I do not have 
decisive reason to engage in the killing spree or (given the options) to participate in the 
chicken-wing-eating contest. But why not? It is of course because I have other reasons which 
outweigh or override the pro tanto reasons that I have to maximize power. This the 
constitutivist acknowledges. But what explains the force and weight of these reasons? If the 
constitutivist has no story about why one has more reason to do less power-conducive over 
more power-conducive activities in many circumstances, in what sense is it a comprehensive 
meta-normative theory? And if it isn’t, can it really claim to be an important contender in the 
landscape of meta-ethical views?  
 For the sake of comparison: The Humean is claiming that all of our reasons are, in 
some sense, a function of our desiderative economy. The objective realist (of one stripe 
anyway) is claiming that all of our reasons for action are a function of facts about the mind-
independent evaluative truths regarding various courses of action. Even the Korsgaardian 
constitutivist is seeking to account for reasons for action in general. But the Nietzschean 
constitutivist, in marked contrast, is claiming simply that some of our reasons (which are 
merely pro tanto reasons anyway) are a function of the supposedly “inescapable” structure of 
  
human action. Whereas one can, in principle, just be a Humean or a Parfitian Realist or a 
Korsgaardian constructivist across the board when it comes to what we have overriding 
reason to do, one cannot just be a Nietzschean constitutivist. Yet if it is, at best, only part of 
the story about normativity, and not a story about overriding normativity at all, how can it 
offer itself as a serious meta-ethical rival to these theories? One challenge for the Nietzschean 
constitutivist is to explain why this theory should be taken as a major account of meta-
normativity when it—assuming it succeeds at all—only explains a portion of the domain in 
question and not even the most important aspect of that domain. 
 
Conclusion 
 Constitutivism is structurally very interesting because of its claim to offer us 
categorical reasons, reasons that are not dependent on our contingent desires. In this way, it 
seeks to be an improvement over the Humean theory.
xxxvii
 It is supposed, further, to be 
generating this normativity out of the inescapable aims of human action, so in this way it 
doesn’t need to appeal to independent and potentially spooky ideas of normative properties 
out in the world. In this way, it seeks to be an improvement over certain non-naturalist 
objective realist theories.
xxxviii
 It thus has considerable promise. But I have so far given some 
reasons for doubt about whether it can succeed. Constitutivism doesn’t, it seems to me, 
deliver up a satisfying account of normativity. As Katsafanas shows in the first chapter of his 
book, all major meta-ethical theories face serious unanswered questions and limitations. 
Constitutivism, though, would seem to have more challenges than most, and it is not a theory 
I would thus be eager to embrace myself. However, it is easier to be negative than positive, 
and I’m not defending some alternative theory here. At the very least, it is good to have the 
range of possibilities increased by having such an interesting and original theory added to the 
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